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COMMENTS
ARMORED PLATING AND ALUMINUM FOIL
ARE NOT LIKE PRODUCTS:
CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNITED STATES’
OVERBROAD INTERPRETATION OF
ARTICLE XXI OF THE GATT
ANTHONY NARDI*
In 2018, the United States imposed tariffs on the importation of steel and
aluminum in the name of economic security. The Trump administration alleged
that the influx of low-cost foreign steel and aluminum hurt domestic steel and
aluminum manufacturers economically to the point that they were decreasing
production. In turn, the administration argued that a decrease in steel and
aluminum production would lead to national security threats, especially if the
United States could no longer produce the steel and aluminum necessary for military
consumption. In response, eight fellow member states of the World Trade Organization
initiated dispute settlement proceedings against the United States. The members alleged
that the steel and aluminum tariffs exceeded the United States’ tariff bindings and
that the United States could not invoke the security exception in GATT Article XXI
because economic security is not an “essential security interest.”

* Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 69; J.D. Candidate, May
2020, American University Washington College of Law; M.A., International Relations, 2017,
University of Florida; B.A., Political Science, 2014, University of Florida. I would like to
thank Professor Padideh Ala’i and Professor Aluisio de Lima-Campos for fostering my
interest in international trade and guiding me through the publication process. I am
eternally grateful for my Note & Comment Editor, Hannah Stambaugh, for her words
of encouragement, quick wit, and active red pen, and to the entire Law Review staff for
their diligent work. Finally, a special thank you to my family and friends-without whom
this would all be meaningless.

629

630

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:629

This Comment argues that the United States’ proposition that economic
security is national security has stretched the meaning of “essential security
interest” past its breaking point, and, in doing so, has violated its obligations
under the GATT. Specifically, an analysis of the term “essential security
interest” under both Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT clearly shows that the drafters
of the GATT did not intend for the security exception to encompass economic
security. Accordingly, by implementing tariffs only to protect its economic security,
the United States has breached its treaty obligations under the GATT and a dispute
resolution panel will ensure they face economic repercussions.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine for a moment that you are playing a game of Monopoly with
a group of friends. You pass “Go.” You collect $200. You land on Park
Place. You purchase the property for $350. You land on the “Go To Jail”
space. You go to jail. While all of these actions may have positive or
negative consequences for you as a player, it is our shared common
understanding that we play Monopoly according to the series of rules
set forth in the rulebook, else the game descends into strife and conflict.
Now it is your friend Tom’s turn. Tom rolls a six and lands on
“Community Chest.” Tom picks a card and reads it to the group, “Go to
Jail. Go directly to jail. Do not pass Go, do not collect $200.” Tom picks
up his piece, moves it past “Go,” collects $200, and places his piece
outside of the jail, showing the other players that he has a “Get Out of
Jail Free” card. All the other players are aghast. The common
understanding is that players cannot use their “Get Out of Jail Free” card
until the next turn after they have gone to jail. You tell Tom, “Hey, you
cannot collect $200 until your next lap of the board.” To which Tom
replies, “there is actually an exception in the rules; only the reader of
the Community Chest card can interpret its meaning. I believe that a
‘Get Out of Jail Free’ card can be used immediately when a player is sent
to jail, and the other players are not allowed to dispute my interpretation.”
The next player, Timmy, also rolls a six. Timmy lands on “Community
Chest,” and picks up the card. Timmy reads, “Collect $100.” Timmy then
asks the banker for $50,000, exclaiming “That is my interpretation of the
card.” From here, the game is over. The interpretive exception has
swallowed the rule, and the players now wield the exception as a sword
to defeat any attempt to enforce the rules. We learn that when a rule
set allows for discretionary exceptions, there must be some institutional
oversight; otherwise, the members will use the exception as a tool to
evade the established rules.
The rules of Monopoly are analogous to the rules set forth in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),1 which is the primary
treaty that the World Trade Organization (WTO) enforces. WTO
Member states are bound to abide by the provisions of the GATT when they
engage in international trade with other Members.2 In a similar manner to
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 4 U.S.T. 639, 55
U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
2. Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
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Monopoly, when one Member abuses its discretionary power under the
rules, the other Members follow suit so as not to lose out on a potential
economic benefit. This Comment analyzes whether the United States has
incorrectly invoked a discretionary exception to the general GATT rules.
On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two Presidential
Proclamations that could have the effect of destroying the GATT.
Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705, titled “Adjusting Imports of
Aluminum into the United States” and “Adjusting Imports of Steel into
the United States” respectively, provided for an increase in the import
tariffs that are applied to steel and aluminum products imported to the
United States after March 23, 2018, in the interest of economic security.3
Under the GATT, a Member can change the value of its import tariffs as
long as the Member does not set the tariff rate above the upper limit of
its set tariff binding.4 However, Article XXI acts as a discretionary
exception to these tariff-binding obligations, which allows Members to
raise their tariffs above the bindings when they consider it necessary for
the protection of their essential security interest.5
This Comment asserts that the United States’ use of economic security
instead of national security to justify its increased tariffs violated Article
XXI of the GATT, as the drafters of the GATT did not intend for
“essential security interests” to encompass tariffs based solely on economic
security. Using the applicable treaty interpretation tools provided in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,6 this Comment shows that the
GATT itself does not give a definitive interpretation of Article XXI and
that the provision’s true meaning can only be deduced from the
GATT’s negotiating history.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the international
trade system and its governing treaty, the GATT.7 It then highlights
relevant prior cases that have struggled to interpret Article XXI.8 Next,
it deals with the threshold question of justiciability.9 After establishing
the framework of the system, this Comment details the current steel
3. See Proclamation No. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 8, 2018); Proclamation
No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018).
4. GATT, supra note 1, art. II (tariff bindings are the upper limits for tariffs that
Members agree to when joining the WTO).
5. See id. art. XXI.
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
7. See infra Section I.A.1–3.
8. See infra Section I.A.4.
9. See infra Section I.A.5.
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and aluminum tariffs and the circumstances around their imposition.10
Then, it looks to the Vienna Convention and details the step-by-step
process of treaty interpretation, with particular attention paid to the
WTO’s consistent practice.11
Part II analyzes each step of treaty interpretation, looking first to Article
31 of the Vienna Convention and the general rules of treaty
interpretation.12 After exhausting those interpretive tools, this section
then looks to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, and the supplemental
means of treaty interpretation, to determine the correct interpretation of
Article XXI.13 This Comment concludes that in light of the intent of the
drafters to create a narrow essential security exception, the WTO
Appellate Body should find that economic security alone does not fall
within the treaty language of essential security interests.
I. BACKGROUND
A. WTO Structure and the Birth of GATT Article XXI
1.

Formation of the GATT & WTO
Any discussion of the contemporary international trading system must
start at its origin, the post-World War II environment. After the horrors
of World War II, the international community determined that it was
necessary to bind the economies of states together in an effort to prevent
further global conflict.14 To that end, delegates from forty-four allied
states met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 to regulate the
international monetary and financial order.15 The conference attendees
envisioned creating three institutions to maintain the economic system:
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which is now part of the World
Bank Group; and the International Trade Organization (ITO).16

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section II.B.1.
See infra Section II.B.2.
See EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON
WOODS 1–3 (1973).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 12.
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The attendees drafted the charters of the IMF and World Bank at the
conference, which the relevant states ratified shortly thereafter.17
However, the ITO did not have the same fate. Reportedly, all delegates
agreed that international trade was of sufficient importance to the goal
of preventing future conflict that it was necessary to create an
international organization for oversight.18 The problem was that the
delegates attending the Bretton Woods conference were finance
ministers and not trade ministers, so the delegates decided only that the
present states should negotiate this institution at a later point.19 The
trade ministers finally met in Havana, Cuba in 1947 and drafted the
charter for the ITO, which over fifty countries signed.20 Unfortunately,
the U.S. Senate never ratified the treaty, and without the United States’
support, the ITO withered and died.21
However, at the same time as the ITO negotiations took place, the
same states conducted a series of parallel negotiations in Geneva.22
These negotiations resulted in the GATT, which the delegates signed on
October 30, 1947.23 The GATT negotiations were different from the
ITO in one major respect: while the ITO was a proposed international
institution, with all the physical and regulatory capacity that comes with
an institution, the GATT simply outlined a treaty that would define the
boundaries of the international trading system.24 The GATT had two
goals: first, reduce tariffs, and second, promote trade liberalization.25
The defining characteristic of the GATT was that every Member had
to affirmatively agree with the proposed matter in order for the GATT
to make any decision.26 This consensual form of decision-making is a

17. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 2
U.N.T.S. 39; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
18. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1–2 (2d ed. 2004).
19. Id.
20. The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.
wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm [https://perma.cc/VCA7-DR37].
21. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 18, at 2.
22. The GATT Years, supra note 20.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Michael Tomz, Judith L. Goldstein & Douglas Rivers, Do We Really Know That
the WTO Increases Trade? Comment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 2005, 2005–07 (2007).
26. See Jaime Tijmes-Lhl, Consensus and Majority Voting in the WTO, 8 WORLD TRADE
REV. 417, 422 (2009) (“[P]articipation is not enough for fulfilling the necessary
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side effect of the non-institutional nature of the agreement and
extended even to the dispute settlement process.27 This led to one major
failure of the GATT system: a single Member could block parties from
adopting a dispute settlement panel report and prevent the panel’s
remedy from going into effect, even if the Member was the losing party.28
However, the GATT is a living treaty, having had eight “rounds” of
negotiation from 1948 to 1994.29 During the most recently completed
round, the “Uruguay Round,” the Members determined that they needed
a fully-fledged institutional system, similar to the ITO, to create rules and
settle disputes with binding effect.30
Though the goals of the WTO were largely identical to those of the
GATT, there were two significant changes. First, the Members created
an appellate review mechanism for panel decisions, the Appellate
Body.31 Second, under the WTO, Members must unanimously agree not
to adopt a panel decision, making it virtually impossible for a losing
party to halt the implementation of a panel decision.32 The conclusion
of the Uruguay Round and the signing of the Marrakesh Declaration
marked the birth of the WTO.33
2.

GATT Article XXI
GATT Article XXI is a security exception to the rights and obligations
that Member states have contracted for under the GATT.34 Article XXI
includes a short chapeau35 and three substantive components.
Subsection A provides, “Nothing in [the GATT] shall be construed . . .
to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure
condition that no-one’s objections are ignored, since additionally the treaties have to
be approved by everyone.”).
27. Id.
28. A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/English/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm [https://perma.cc/P6FG-N9W5].
29. The GATT Years, supra note 20 (describing in detail each set of negotiations
and agreements that became known as “rounds” in GATT nomenclature).
30. The GATT Uruguay Round, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. BRIEFING PAPER (1987),
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6726.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CKF-MV6F].
31. See DSU, supra note 2.
32. Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm [https://perma.cc/YTC6-W53S].
33. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (the multilateral agreement that denotes the
transition between the GATT era and the formal establishment of the WTO).
34. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI.
35. In international law, a chapeau is introductory text in a treaty laying out its
principles, objectives, and background. JON R. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1998).
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of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests.”36
Subsection B continues that the GATT shall not be construed “to prevent
any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests,” specifically those that
relate to (i) fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived, (ii) goods relating to arms, ammunition, or other implements of
war that directly or indirectly supply a military establishment, and (iii) or
other actions taken in a “time of war or other emergency in international
relations.”37 Finally, subsection C provides that “nothing in [the GATT]
shall be construed . . . to prevent any contracting party from taking any
action in pursuance of its obligation under the United Nations Charter for
the maintenance of international peace and security.”38 Therefore, Article
XXI deals with five explicitly different security-related issues: the
disclosure of confidential information, preventative measures taken to
safeguard nuclear materials, actions dealing with the flow of weapons for
use in a military establishment, any actions taken in a time of war, and
actions that a Member must take to fulfill their U.N. obligation to
maintain peace and security.39
Several elements of Article XXI are ripe for interpretation because of
their ambiguity, primarily, the phrase “essential security interests.”40
The most relevant indicia of the original intent of Article XXI comes
from the drafting history of the article. One of the members of the
drafting committee said of Article XXI, “[w]e cannot make it too tight,
because we cannot prohibit measures which are needed purely for
security reasons. On the other hand, we cannot make it so broad that,
under the guise of security, countries will put on measures which really
have a commercial purpose.”41
The Chair of the drafting committee echoed this sentiment but,
when pushed on a solution, only suggested that the spirit in which the
Members interpret the provision would safeguard against abuse of
Article XXI.42 His statement implies that an analysis of good faith is
necessary when determining if a Member has permissibly invoked

36. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI(a).
37. Id. art. XXI(b).
38. Id. art. XXI(c).
39. See id. art. XXI.
40. See id. art. XXI(a)–(b).
41. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/33 (July 24, 1947).
42. See id.
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Article XXI.43 This ambiguity demonstrates the need for panels to use
supplementary means to interpret Article XXI.
3.

GATT Article XX
One of the primary sources to look to for interpretive guidance
regarding the meaning of Article XXI is Article XX, the general exceptions
to GATT obligations.44 Specifically, subsection (d) provides that Members
can disregard their WTO obligations when “necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Agreement.”45 It is a well-understood principle of treaty interpretation
that interpreters can look to other uses of a word in the same treaty to
understand the term’s meaning in a separate provision.46
The term “necessary” appears in both Article XX and Article XXI and
should therefore have a similar meaning.47 However, unlike Article XXI,
Article XX has been heavily litigated, and the WTO has adopted binding
Appellate Body reports governing the interpretation of “necessary.” In
Thailand—Cigarettes, for example, the Appellate Body48interpreted the
term “necessary” to mean the least GATT-inconsistent method available.49
Meaning for a measure to be consistent with Article XX(d) there must be
no alternative option available to the Member to get the desired result.50
4.

Prior use
To date, Members have invoked Article XXI on few occasions, all prior
to the creation of the WTO. The GATT Council, however, declined to
adopt the panel’s decision in each instance. The United States was the
first to invoke Article XXI shortly after the creation of the GATT in 1948
to import goods for the Marshall Plan without paying import duties.51
Czechoslovakia challenged this practice, arguing that the United States
had misapplied Article XXI “because the narrow reference in the text to
43. Following from the perambulatory language of the VCLT. VCLT, supra note 6,
pmbl. (“[N]oting that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta
sunt servanda rule are universally recognized.”).
44. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX.
45. Id. art. XX(d).
46. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.1–4.
47. GATT, supra note 1, arts. XX(b), XXI.
48. Appellate Body Report, Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes,
WTO Doc. WT/DS371/AB/R (adopted June 17, 2011).
49. Id. ¶ 177.
50. Id.
51. GATT Council, Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, at 2–3, GATT Doc.
CP.3/SR.22 (June 8, 1949).
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war materials had been construed by the United States Government to
cover a wide range of goods which could never be so regarded.”52 The
Members unanimously voted against the creation of a panel to litigate
this issue, mainly on the grounds of justiciability, which this Comment
discusses next.53 However, even at this early moment in Article XXI’s
existence, particularly in an instance where no Member could seriously
fault the United States for not paying tariffs on Marshall Plan goods, the
British delegation reasserted that Members must respect the object and
purpose of the GATT even when invoking Article XXI, stating “Members
should be cautious not to take any step which might have the effect of
undermining the General Agreement.”54
The GATT membership summarily dealt with the second and third
invocations of Article XXI in short order. Neither Ghana’s 1961
invocation to boycott Portuguese goods55 nor Sweden’s 1975 invocation
regarding shoe tariffs56 resulted in an adopted panel report.
In 1982, the Falklands War forced the GATT Council to make a
decision about Article XXI. The entire European Economic Community
(EEC) imposed an embargo on Argentina over the Falkland Islands
dispute in a show of solidarity with England.57 For the first time, there was
no security pretext for the invocation of Article XXI; the EEC simply
placed the noneconomic measures and told the membership that
there was nothing they could do about it.58 The GATT Council “punted”
on the justiciability issue;59 however, it did release a decision about
Article XXI generally, stating that trade measures taken for security
reasons “could constitute . . . an element of disruption and uncertainty
for international trade,”60 again asserting that the object and purpose of
the GATT must be acknowledged when invoking Article XXI.

52. Id. at 3.
53. See infra Section I.A.5.
54. Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, supra note 51, at 3.
55. GATT Council, Summary Record of the Twelfth Session, at 196, GATT Doc.
SR.19/12 (Dec. 21, 1961).
56. Report of the Panel Notification of Global Import Quota, Sweden—Import
Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT Doc. L/4250 (Nov. 17, 1975).
57. See Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, at 2,
GATT Doc. L/5317 (Apr. 30, 1982) (discussing, in a letter, the embargo and the EEC’s
restrictions on Argentina).
58. Id.
59. See infra Section I.A.5.
60. GATT Council, Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, GATT
Doc. L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982).
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In 1985, the United States was once again the asserting party, this
time defending the trade embargo that President Reagan placed on
Nicaragua.61 In a return to prior form, the membership declined to
refer the matter to a panel, reaffirmed a Member’s inherent right to
protect its security interests, and failed to create a binding report.62 In
short, the existing GATT jurisprudence is inadequate to conclusively
interpret Article XXI.
5.

Justiciability
Before analyzing the United States’ recent interpretation of Article
XXI, the Appellate Body must address the threshold question of
justiciability. Justiciability, also known in the international trade lexicon
as the doctrine of self-judging, is similar to the United States’ notion of
the political question doctrine.63 Namely, there are certain issues that
the courts do not have jurisdiction to decide and thus they are the
domain of politicians, or negotiators in the WTO context.64 The WTO
takes a similar approach to Marbury v. Madison with respect to this
doctrine. Like the U.S. President, Members of the WTO are “invested
with certain political powers, in the exercise of which [they are] to use
[their] own discretion.” Further, there is “no power to control that
discretion.”6566 As stated in the summary report of the 1947 Geneva
Charter draft, “Members may . . . do whatever they think necessary to
protect their security interests relating to atomic materials, arms traffic,
and wartime or other international emergencies.”67
To date, no GATT panel or WTO Appellate Body has addressed the
issue of justiciability in any binding dispute resolution proceeding.
Although Members have invoked Article XXI, panels have always
sidestepped the issue and declined to resolve cases on the merits of Article

61. Report by the Panel, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, L/6053
(Oct. 13, 1986).
62. Id.
63. Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 697,
698 (2011).
64. Id.
65. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166–67 (1803) (holding that some questions
are fundamentally political, and in these cases, courts should decline to exercise
jurisdiction).
66. Id. at 166.
67. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, An Informal Summary of the
ITO Charter, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/INF.8 (Nov. 21, 1947).
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XXI,68 and before the WTO, the GATT Council did not adopt the panel
reports and thus they have no binding effect.69 There are many examples
of GATT Members asserting their absolute right to determine what
constitutes an essential security interest before the dispute settlement
body. In the GATT dispute proceeding between Ghana and Portugal
concerning Ghana’s boycott of Portuguese goods during Portugal’s
accession to the GATT, the Ghanaian government argued that each
Member state was the sole judge of what was necessary for its essential
security interest.70 The Ghanaian government asserted that no Member
could object to the boycott because “a country’s security interests may be
threatened by a potential as well as an actual danger,” which in this case
was the mere presence of Portugal in nearby Angola.71
The European Economic Community (EEC) and Argentina revisited
these arguments in the Falkland Islands dispute.72 The EEC argued it had
taken trade-restrictive measures based on its inherent right under Article
XXI, that the exercise of those rights required “neither notification,
justification, nor approval,”73 and that “every [Member] was—in the last
resort—the judge of its exercise of these rights.”74
Two third parties to the dispute, Canada and Australia, reached
similar conclusions but used different logic.75 Canada asserted that the
GATT was the improper forum to resolve this issue,76 and Australia
conceded that Article XXI did apply, but that the measure was justified
68. Report of the Panel, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, L/6053
(Oct. 13, 1986). Nicaragua sued the United States because of the U.S. embargo. Both
parties agreed that the United States had acted against the trade-facilitating provisions
of the GATT but disagreed on whether XXI justified this noncompliance. The Panel
concluded was not authorized to examine the U.S. justification for invoking the
security exception of the GATT. Thus, it could find neither that the United States
complied with, or failed to comply with, its obligations under the GATT.
69. Sweden—Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, supra note 56.
70. Summary Record of the Twelfth Session, supra note 55, at 196 (“[U]nder this Article
each contracting party was the sole judge of what was necessary in its essential security
interests. There could therefore be no objection to Ghana regarding the boycott of
goods as justified by its security interests.”).
71. Id.
72. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting, GATT Doc. C/M/157, at 10 (June 22, 1982).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10–11.
76. Id. at 10 (“Canada was convinced that the situation which had necessitated the
measures had to be satisfactorily resolved by appropriate action elsewhere, as the
GATT had neither the competence nor the responsibility to deal with the political
issue which had been raised.”).
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under XXI(c).77 Argentina countered that “in order to justify [trade]
restrictive measures a [Member] invoking Article XXI would specifically
be required to state reasons of national security” and without those
statements, the Member would violate its GATT obligations.78 This
position is consistent with the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, which
declared that the Members undertook to “abstain from taking restrictive
trade measures, for reasons of a non-economic character.”79
This leaves three options for analyzing justiciability. First, a fully Membercentric approach where the Member has all the power to determine if the
measure is essential and if it relates to an enumerated provision.80 Second, an
approach where the Member determines if the measure is necessary, but
the question of if the measure fits into an enumerated provision is subject
to judicial review.81 Third, a middle ground approach, where the
Member has full authority to determine if the security measure is
essential, but the measure would be subject to judicial review.82 This
approach is most appropriate as it tracks with the general intent of the
international trade community, as evidenced by the creation of a
binding dispute resolution system to address problems on a multilateral
basis, instead of a purely reciprocal basis.83

77. Id. at 11. The Australian delegation justified the acts under Art. XXI(c), which
they argued did not require notification or justification. Id.
78. Id. at 12.
79. GATT, Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 29 November 1982, GATT Doc. L/5424,
at 3 (adopted Nov. 29, 1982).
80. Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says, and
What the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 268–69 (1998) (describing
how the phrasing of the section “allows the WTO Member invoking sanction measures
sole discretion to determine whether an action conforms to the requirements set forth
in Article XXI(b)”).
81. Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO
Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance
Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413, 418 (2001) (articulating
that the interpretation that members can self-define their interests “does not inherently
address the question as to whether these interests should be self-defining . . . . The power
to impose non-reviewable security-based sanctions is especially troublesome” based on
the intent of the parties to resolve concerns multilaterally).
82. Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute
Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 424,
426 (1999) (asserting that the “correct assessment of the relevance of the national
security exception to the WTO’s jurisdiction, i.e., to the allocation of decision-making
power between states parties and the organization, is the distinction between the
authority to interpret and the authority to define”).
83. Id. at 435, 439–40.
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This Comment assumes that Article XXI is justiciable, particularly
under the third interpretive method, where the Member determines
what is essential and the WTO can review.84
B. The 2018 Tariffs
President Trump imposed a series of tariffs on steel and aluminum on
March 8, 2018.85 The President derived his authority to impose these
tariffs from section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, which allows the
President to enter into trade agreements or modify existing trade
agreements when foreign countries place an undue burden on or
restrict U.S. trade.86 Section 232 permits the President to impose
safeguard tariffs on goods when national security concerns require that
the President consider “domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements.”87 Safeguards are a subcategory of tariffs
that a state can use to protect its domestic industry even when there are
no unfair trade practices, such as dumping or subsidization.88 The WTO
Safeguard Agreement permits the use of safeguard tariffs for limited
periods when a Member can show a significant spike in imports.89 When
administering section 232, “the President shall further recognize the
close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national
security, and shall take into consideration the impact of foreign
competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries.”90
When announcing the tariffs, President Trump justified them as “vital
to our national security” because “steel is steel. You don’t have steel, you
don’t have a country.”91 In November 2018, seven WTO Members—
China, the European Union (EU), Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, and
Turkey—requested that the WTO establish panels to review the section
84. Id.; Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 40
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 467 (2008).
85. Section 232 Tariffs on Aluminum and Steel, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/entry-summary/232-tariffsaluminum-and-steel [https://perma.cc/VK3H-YJY9].
86. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012).
87. Id. § 1862(d).
88. Safeguard Measures, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/safeg_e/safeg_e.htm [https://perma.cc/LG4C-VHRB].
89. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note
33, art. 2 ¶ 1, Annex 1A.
90. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d).
91. Scott Horsley, Trump Formally Orders Tariffs on Steel, Aluminum Imports, NPR
(Mar. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591744195 [https://
perma.cc/C2NE-YAY9].

2019]

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XXI OF THE GATT

643

232 tariffs for compliance with the WTO Safeguard Agreement.92 At
the time, the international community expected that the United States
would invoke Article XXI, alleging it did not produce steel and aluminum
in “a sufficient and reasonably available amount” to necessitate safeguards
to protect national security.93
However, on December 9, 2018, the official government rationale
changed when Peter Navarro,94 Assistant to the President and Director of
the Office of Trade and Manufacturing, released an op-ed in
RealClearPolitics titled Why Economic Security is National Security.95 The
following day, the government posted the same article on the official
White House website.96 The article asserted that the rationale for the steel
and aluminum tariffs was economic security and thus relied on the
presumption that economic security is an essential security interest for
the purpose of Article XXI.97
At the November 21, 2018 meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB), the DSB agreed to the seven Members’ requests that the
DSB establish panels to examine the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs. It
also created four additional panels at the United States’ request98 to
examine retaliatory safeguard countermeasures applied by China,

92. Justine Coyne, WTO Panels to Review US 232 Tariffs on Steel, Aluminum, S&P
GLOBAL: PLATTS METALS DAILY (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/
en/market-insights/latest-news/metals/112118-wto-panels-to-review-us-section-232tariffs-on-steel-aluminum.
93. Saud Aldawsari et al., Updates on the Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum:
Exclusion Requests, WTO Challenges, and Reactions from U.S. Trading Partners, JD SUPRA:
KING & SPALDING (July 6, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/updates-on-thesection-232-tariffs-on-97452 [https://perma.cc/6QAN-38CY].
94. See generally Annie Lowrey, The ‘Madman’ Behind Trump’s Trade Theory, ATL. (Dec.
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/12/peter-navarro-trumptrade/573913.
95. Peter Navarro, Why Economic Security Is National Security, REALCLEAR POL. (Dec.
9, 2018), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/12/09/why_economic
_security_is_national_security_138875.html [https://perma.cc/3GFS-M6RK].
96. Peter Navarro, Why Economic Security Is National Security, WHITE HOUSE:
ECONOMY & JOBS (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/economicsecurity-national-security [https://perma.cc/M92Z-X7KE].
97. Id.
98. Panels Established to Review US Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, Countermeasures on US
Imports, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e
/news18_e/dsb_19nov18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/VBS9-DNBF] (United States—
Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, DS554, DS548, DS550, DS551,
DS552, DS554, DS654).
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Canada, the European Union, and Mexico.99 The seven Members
reiterated their claim that the United States had implemented the
measures on steel and aluminum to “protect the U.S. steel and aluminum
industries from the economic effects of imports,” even though the United
States asserts the measures are to protect national security.100
The seven went further, disagreeing with the United States’
argument that the invocation of Article XXI by the United States
precluded the WTO panel from examining the claim.101 In the request
for panel formation, the Members argued, “While national security was
a sensitive matter, panels were fully within their right to examine
whether such claims are justified under the exception.”102 Several
Members went on to assert that the “resort to Article XXI by the United
States would frustrate the purpose of WTO dispute settlement and could
render all WTO obligations effectively unenforceable.”103 The DSB
created eleven panels on January 25, 2019, to resolve all claims.104
If the Members were to prevail in their claims against the United States,
the Appellate Body would have to determine if the steel and aluminum
tariffs constituted a nullification or impairment of benefits under Article
XXIII.105 The WTO considers “nullification and impairment” to be any
material change to a Member’s actual or expected benefits arising from
the WTO Agreements due to another Member’s failure to carry out its
WTO obligations.106 Specifically, Article XXIII provides a cause of action
for Members seeking redress for a GATT violation:

99. Id. (Canada/China/European Union/Mexico—Additional Duties on Certain
Products from the United States, DS557, DS558, DS559, DS560).
100. Id. (“The seven members reiterated their belief that the U.S. measures,
allegedly taken for national security reasons, were, in their content and substance,
safeguard measures taken to protect the U.S. steel and aluminum industries from the
economic effects of imports.”).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WORLD TRADE
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds544_e.htm [https:
//perma.cc/UDS9-595S]; see also Coyne, supra note 92; Panels Established to Review US
Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, Countermeasures on US Imports, supra note 98.
105. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII.
106. Glossary Term: Nullification and Impairment, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/nullification_and_impairment_e
.htm [https://perma.cc/3XR4-MHTJ].
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[A]ny [Member] should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly
or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that
the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as
the result of (a) the failure of another [Member] to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another
[Member] of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions
of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation.107

If the economic security rationale underlying the tariffs is outside the
scope of essential security interests, then imposing them would constitute
a prima facie case of nullification and impairment under Article XXIII,
and the United States would be required to remove the tariff.108
C. Tools for Treaty Interpretation: The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties
To determine if the steel and aluminum tariffs fall within the security
exception, the Appellate Body must determine the correct interpretation
of Article XXI. When the express language of an international treaty
contains ambiguity, treaty interpreters must use particular methods to
determine the proper interpretation.109 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties110 (VCLT) is a codification of the primary methods of
customary treaty interpretation in international law. Customary
international law “consists of the rules of law derived from the
consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law
required them to act in that way” and is binding on all states, even when
a state is not party to any treaty on the matter.111
Customary international law has two elements: first, there must be an
extensive and virtually uniform state practice, and second, the states must
exercise the practice in a manner that evidences a belief that the practice
is obligatory, or opinio juris.112 The International Law Commission lists
107. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII.
108. Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing
Asbestos, ¶ 185, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001).
109. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.
110. Id.
111. SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1984);
see also Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Customary International Law, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L.
667, 671 (1995) (comparing schools of thought on customary law purpose and
formation); Customary Law, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en
/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law [https://perma.cc/G635-SQVX].
112. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20)
(affirming that there is a subjective element of cooperation whereby “[t]he States
concerned must . . . feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation”).
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treaties, decisions of national and international courts, diplomatic
correspondence, and the practice of international organizations as
evidence of customary international law.113
In 1989, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explicitly held that the
preexisting principles of treaty interpretation “are reflected in Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may in
many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary
international law on the point” and the ICJ has reiterated that standard over
time.114 As of yet, the ICJ has never found that the VCLT does not reflect
customary international law, especially with respect to Articles 31 and 32,
which are the operative provisions.115
The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea,116 the European
Court of Human Rights,117 and the European Court of Justice118 share the
view that the operative provisions of the VCLT are universally binding as
customary international law.119 Establishing the customary nature of the
VCLT is paramount as the United States is not a signatory to the treaty.
However, the U.S. Department of State has explicitly recognized that
“[while] the U.S. Senate has not given its advice and consent to the treaty[,]
[t]he United States considers many of the provisions of the [VCLT] to
constitute customary international law on the law of treaties.”120 As the
United States recognizes the VCLT as customary international law and has

113. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 367–72, U.N. Doc.
A/1316 (July 1950) (referencing for example specific volumes of documents and agreements
assembled by the League of Nations, United Nations, and International Court of Justice).
114. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J.
53, ¶ 48 (Nov. 12); see also Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa
Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, ¶ 47 (July 13) (affirming the status of
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention as customary international law); LaGrand
(Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶ 99 (June 27).
115. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.
ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1498
[https://perma.cc/GY3Z-3WNV] (last updated June 2006).
116. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons & Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 15
ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 57.
117. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1345, ¶ 65; Al-Saadoon &
Mufdhi v. U.K., 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 762, ¶ 126.
118. Case C-386/08, Firma Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, 2010 E.C.R.
I-01289, ¶¶ 41, 43; Case C-63/09, Axel Walz v. Clickair SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-04239, ¶ 23.
119. See id.
120. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://www.
state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [https://perma.cc/4PM4-SDTJ].
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not been a persistent objector121 to the operative provisions, both Articles
31 and 32 are binding on the United States and in litigation before
international tribunals involving the United States.
Interpretation is necessary to give effect to the expressed intentions of
the parties as expressed in the words they used in the light of their
surrounding circumstances.122 Therefore, according to legal scholarship,
interpretation is always appropriate, as “[a]ny application of a treaty,
including its execution, presupposes . . . a preceding conscious or
subconscious interpretation of the treaty.”123 Therefore, interpretation is a
primary process that applies even if the plain terms of the treaty are clear.
Two competing temporal approaches to treaty interpretation, static
and dynamic, provide essential context to the specific provisions of the
VCLT. A static approach looks at what the words of the treaty meant at
the conclusion of the treaty, similar to how an originalist in the United
States would interpret the Constitution as the founders understood it
at the time of signing.124 The dynamic approach is similar to the U.S.
understanding of living constitutionalism, which interprets the treaty in
light of the world at the present time.125 The WTO has adopted the
dynamic approach to interpret generic terms,126 following the logic from
the ICJ that where parties use generic terms in a treaty, they must
“necessarily hav[e] been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to
evolve over time, and where the treaty . . . is ‘of continuing duration,’ the
parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms

121. A persistent objector is a state that has clearly and consistently objected to a
rule of customary international law for the entirety of the rule’s existence. Persistent
objector states are not bound by customary international law, unless that custom
captures a peremptory norm. Persistent Objector, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.
ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1455
[https://perma.cc/JDU4-JVS8] (last updated September 2006).
122. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 365 (1961).
123. Georg Schwarzenberger, Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation, 9 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1, 8 (1968).
124. MCNAIR, supra note 122, at 424; see William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).
125. MCNAIR, supra note 122, at 385–86; see Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 53
(June 21) (interpreting a past covenant based both on the time period of when it was
written and the development of law and society since).
126. Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights, ¶ 369, WTO
Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Dec. 21, 2009); Appellate Body Report, United
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 130, WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998).
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to have an evolving meaning.”127 Therefore, this Comment’s analysis
applies the intent of the drafters, rather than the strict text of the treaties,
to the ever-changing realities of the international trade system.
1.

Article 31: General rule of interpretation
Article 31 of the VCLT catalogues the general rules of treaty
interpretation. The proper method of interpretation follows the sequential
order of the provisions in Article 31.
a. Article 31.1
The first subsection of Article 31 reads, “A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”128 All interpretation starts here, as the commentary to the VCLT
states that the “elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an
investigation . . . into the intentions of the parties” should be the starting
point.129 Article 31.1 can be broken down into three disparate components
for analysis: good faith, ordinary meaning, and object and purpose.130 The
standard of good faith in treaty interpretation flows directly from the
internationally recognized norm of pacta sunt servanda, or “agreements
must be kept.”131 This is a fundamental requirement of reasonableness,
which “preclud[es] arbitrary action and [the] abusive use of rights.”132
Next, interpreters must look at the ordinary meaning, as opposed to
any special meaning, of the terms. Here, the Appellate Body has given
additional guidance to supplement the existing VCLT tools. Its
interpretation of “ordinary” means regular, normal, or customary;
however, the Appellate Body cautions that this is how a reasonably
informed person, not a layman, would interpret the term.133 To
determine this meaning, the Appellate Body suggests using a dictionary,

127. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, ¶ 66 (July 13).
128. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.1.
129. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries 220, ¶ 11 (1966) [hereinafter VCLT Commentary].
130. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.1.
131. Id. art. 26.
132. RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 177 (2017).
133. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
¶ 153, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 2, 1999); Appellate Body Report,
EC and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 658, WTO
Doc. WT/DS316/AB/R (adopted May 18, 2011).
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though the Appellate Body has been critical of using a dictionary that
catalogues all, and not just ordinary, meanings of words.134
Lastly, interpreters must analyze the ordinary meaning in light of the
treaty’s object and purpose.135 The context for determining the object
and purpose is the entirety of the treaty, including the title, preamble,
and any annexes, as the structure of the treaty is as important for
interpretation as the express meaning.136 This applies in instances where
the interpreter is comparing the use of the same term in different
sections of the treaty or when different sections of the treaty deal with
the same issue in a different language.137 When determining the object
and purpose, the general rule indicates the entire treaty should have a
single overarching object and purpose.138 Interpreters discern the
purpose through intuition and common sense, as the rule of good faith
acts as a deterrent to outside influences that the drafters of the treaty
did not intend.139 The Appellate Body stresses interpreters should
simultaneously use all three components of Article 31.1, and that the
process should be “an integrated operation, where interpretative rules
and principles must be understood and applied as connected and
mutually reinforcing components of a holistic exercise.”140
b. Article 31.2
Article 31.2 provides additional methods for determining the relevant
context when interpreting a treaty.141 It specifically notes two types of
documents that are useful for context: agreements made between all the

134. Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights, ¶ 348, WTO
Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Dec. 21, 2009); Appellate Body Report, United
States—Measures Affecting Gambling, ¶¶ 164–67, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 7, 2005).
135. VCLT Commentary, supra note 129, at 221, ¶ 12.
136. Competence of the ILO in Regard to International Regulation of the
Conditions of the Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, Advisory Opinion, 1922
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 02, at 23 (Aug. 12).
137. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1992
I.C.J. 351, ¶ 373 (Sept. 11) (illustrating how courts have used this principle in practice).
138. Treaties, Object and Purpose, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., https://opil.ouplaw.
com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1681
[https://perma.cc/8NUR-7EJF] (last updated December 2006).
139. Id.
140. Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights, ¶ 399, WTO
Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Dec. 21, 2009).
141. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.2.
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parties at the conclusion of the treaty142 and instruments made by one
or more parties at the conclusion of the treaty that the other parties
accepted as an instrument of the treaty.143 Subsection (a) recognizes the
principle that a unilaterally constructed document is not part of the
context around the conclusion of a treaty, but instead has to receive some
kind of acceptance by the other parties to become contextual.144
c. Article 31.3
Article 31.3 analyzes the next step in a treaty’s life, looking to the
subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, and the generally relevant
rules of international law.145 Turning first to the subsequent agreements,
this provision and Article 31.2(a) overlap a great deal. The primary
difference is that the agreements under 31.3 are “subsequent,” implying
a necessary time delay between the conclusion of the treaty and the
creation of the agreement.146
Next, interpreters analyze the subsequent practice of the parties to
the treaty.147 The general principle, which underlies this interpretive
tool, is that the parties are the masters of their treaty, and, therefore,
meaning derived from their consistent and consensual subsequent
actions constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the treaty.148 A key
clarification from the WTO explains that the state conduct must
constitute a series of actions or pronouncements, not an isolated
incident.149 Finally, the agreement of the parties is necessary to
establish any subsequent practice.150
The final element of Article 31.3 is the relevant rules of international
law.151 This provision presupposes that the international legal system as
a whole is part of the context of every treaty concluded in the
international system, and thus the relevant rules lay a foundation and
142. Id. art. 31.2 (a).
143. Id. art. 31.2 (b).
144. VCLT Commentary, supra note 129, at 221, ¶ 13.
145. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.3.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167/Add.3 (1964),
reprinted in [1964] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 275, 279 ¶¶ 51–54 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1964 (discussing what specifically would be included as tools and
references for treaty interpretation within the Law of Treaties document).
149. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, 13, WTO Doc.
WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996).
150. Id.
151. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.3.
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provide context for all treaties.152 Thus, as the ICJ stated in the Namibia153
advisory opinion, “an international instrument has to be interpreted and
applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the
time of the interpretation.”154 The WTO has used this expansive provision
to introduce several international rules not based in the WTO treaties.
d. Article 31.4
The final element of Article 31 is the special meaning, which reads, “A
special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.”155 Article 31.4 acts as an exception to 31.1 for treaties where
the parties have agreed, explicitly or implicitly, to replace the ordinary
meaning of a term with a special meaning.156 This is the only component
of Article 31 that looks to the parties’ intent prior to the finalization of
the treaty to interpret its meaning.157 This interpretive tool provides that
the burden of proof lies with the party asserting a special meaning.158
2.

Article 32: Supplementary means of interpretation
Article 32 of the VCLT details the supplementary means of treaty
interpretation and the process to follow to invoke those provisions.
Article 32 is a secondary means of interpretation, only employed when
analysis under Article 31 leads to ambiguity or manifestly absurd
results.159 The most common supplemental action is an analysis of the
preparatory work, or travaux preparatories, and the circumstances
surrounding the signing of the treaty.160
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the predecessor
to the ICJ, created this standard expressly limiting Article 32 with a
restrictive use of preparatory work in the landmark Polish Postal Services161
152. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 53 (June 21).
153. Id.
154. Id. (clarifying for U.N. Members that the continued presence of South Africa
in Namibia was illegal and that Members had an obligation to recognize that illegality).
155. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.4.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See VCLT Commentary, supra note 129, at 222, ¶ 17.
159. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 32.
160. See GARDINER, supra note 132, at 347–49; McNair, supra note 122, at 412 (“It would
hardly be an exaggeration to say that in almost every case involving the interpretation of
a treaty one or both of the parties seeks to invoke the preparatory work.”).
161. Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 11
(May 16).
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case: “It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be
interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their context,
unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or
absurd.”162 The ICJ has adopted this interpretation, and the interpretation
constitutes customary international law.163
The core of Article 32 is determining what documents can be used to
evidence these two components.164 There is no universally recognized
definition of what constitutes preparatory work, or how far back into the
negotiating process an interpreter can look when conducting an Article
32 analysis. Preparatory work is roughly analogous to the legislative history
of U.S. laws.165 International courts and tribunals generally take an
expansive view of preparatory work and admit anything that looks to be
helpful.166 However, three general rules guide preparatory work. First,
the work must be capable of objective assessment.167 Thus, a reasonable
definition of preparatory work might include all documents relevant to
the treaty negotiations, observations by the negotiating states, diplomatic
exchanges, minutes of the meetings, or conference records, as well as the
processes that the documents underwent during negotiations.168
Second, the preparatory work must illuminate a common understanding
of the negotiating states as to their intent of the true meaning of the
treaty.169 This necessitates that the materials have been, at some point,
available to all the parties present in the negotiation.170
Third, the materials must relate directly to the treaty in question.171
However, interpreters do not rigorously follow this rule in practice, as
some will look at preparatory works of preceding or similar treaties and
apply the preparatory work as if it came from the treaty at issue.172 In

162. Id. at ¶ 113.
163. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 8 (Mar. 3).
164. Id.
165. See GARDINER, supra note 132, at 363–64.
166. Id.
167. See Yves le Bouthillier, Article 32: Supplementary Means of Interpretation, in THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 852–56 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
168. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 69 (June 21); Bouthillier, supra
note 167, at 852;
169. See Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, ¶ 45 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2005).
170. See Bouthillier, supra note 167, at 855–56.
171. Id.
172. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶¶ 105–07 (June 21).
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LaGrand173, the ICJ interpreted Article 41 of its governing statute in light
of the drafting history of the identical provision of the PCIJ Statute.174
Having established the criteria of what constitutes preparatory work,
the next step is determining how to define the temporal scope of the
“circumstances of [the] conclusion” of the treaty. The Appellate Body
has ruled on the “circumstances” multiple times. Notably, in European
Communities—Computer Equipment,175 the Appellate Body considered the
customs classification system in place at the time of the creation of the
WTO to be part of the “circumstances of the conclusion” of the WTO
Agreement and used the classification system in the interpretation.176
Further, the Appellate Body in European Communities—Frozen Boneless
Chicken Cuts177 held that “an event . . . may be relevant . . . not only if it
has actually influenced a specific aspect of the treaty text . . . [but also]
when it helps to discern what the common intentions of the parties were
at the time of the conclusion.”178 The breadth of this scope exemplifies
the WTO’s commitment to supplemental means of interpretation.
The WTO considers it proper to introduce preparatory work when
confirming the meaning of a term and when determining the meaning
of a term.179 The first use is not relevant to the discussion of this
Comment. However, there is clear jurisprudence that allows
supplementary means to determine the meaning of terms. Looking at
United States—Measures Affecting Gambling,180 the Appellate Body
concluded that after exhausting the primary rules of interpretation, the
meaning of “other recreational services” still appeared ambiguous and
did not answer the question presented with respect to U.S.

173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See Appellate Body Report, EC—Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS62/AB/R (adopted June 5, 1998).
176. See id. ¶ 92.
177. Appellate Body Report, EC—Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts,
¶¶ 282–309, WTO Doc. WT/DS269/AB/R (adopted Sept. 12, 2005).
178. Id. ¶ 289. The Appellate Body upheld a panel report that looked to EC customs
classifications practice subsequent to the ratification of the WTO Agreement as an
interpretive tool for the WTO Agreement, quoting, “In our view, it is possible that
documents published, events occurring, or practice followed subsequent to the
conclusion of the treaty may give an indication of what were, and what were not, the
‘common intentions of the parties’ at the time of the conclusion.” Id. ¶ 305.
179. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 195–212, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005).
180. Id.

654

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:629

commitments.181 Therefore, the Appellate Body felt “required . . . to
turn to the supplementary means of interpretation provided for in
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.”182 The decision to proceed to
Article 32 is quite simple, as in Chile—Price Band System183 where the panel
“consider[ed] . . . that the text and context of [the terms] alone do not
enable us to determine the meaning of those terms without
ambiguity.”184 The panel then proceeded to analyze the terms under
Article 32 without any further explanation.185
II. ANALYSIS
It is under these customs, treaty laws, international norms, and Latin
phrases that the WTO Appellate Body crafts its jurisprudence. In the
context of this Comment, the Appellate Body must answer three
questions in order to determine if the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs
comply with WTO obligations. First, does the WTO have the
jurisdiction to hear this case, or is the issue entirely non-justiciable?
Second, using the provided tools of treaty interpretation, what does
the term “essential security interest” mean? Third, based on that
interpretation, are the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs in compliance
with the obligations imposed under Article XXI?
A. Question 1: Justiciability
As previously stated, this Comment assumes that the dispute settlement
body would have jurisdiction over this case and that the issue itself is
justiciable. To start, the United States has affirmatively asserted this right
to self-judge the security exception in the case brought by China, stating:
Issues of national security are political matters not susceptible to
review or capable of resolution by WTO dispute settlement. Every
Member of the WTO retains the authority to determine for itself
those matters that it considers necessary to the protection of its
essential security interests, as is reflected in the text of Article XXI
of the GATT 1994.186

181. Id.
182. Id. ¶ 195.
183. Panel Report, Chile—Price Band System, WTO Doc. WT/DS207/R (adopted May
3, 2002).
184. Id. ¶ 7.35.
185. See id.
186. Communication from the United States, United States—Certain Measures on Steel
and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS544/2 (Apr. 13, 2018).
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All seven Members rebutted this argument, to varying degrees, in
their requests for consultation, “arguing that while national security
was a sensitive matter, panels were fully within their right to examine
whether such claims are justified under the exception.”187 The
European Union argued that the application of section 232 did not
necessarily imply a national security measure, within the meaning of
Article XXI, when the implementation happened “ostensibly because
of an alleged threat to the national security of the United States.”188
The EU found that because of the application of section 232, the
United States was acting inconsistently with obligations and rights
provided for in the WTO Agreement, which is a matter well within the
scope of a panel’s jurisdiction.189
Mexico and Canada shared a similar approach to the issue, arguing
that, as applied, the tariffs did not act for a primarily national security
purpose.190 Therefore, they asserted that the blanket non-justiciability of
national security is not applicable in this instance, as the interest put forth
was economic security, which is not within the scope of Article XXI.191
Based on the arguments put forward, the underlying assumption of
this Comment, and the recent panel report in Russia—Measures
Concerning Traffic in Transit192 the Appellate Body would likely find that
judicial review is permissible. This case, which concerned Russia
restricting Ukraine from using transit routes across Russia, in
contravention of WTO obligations, was the first time a WTO panel
interpreted the self-judging provision of Article XXI.193 The panel
187. Panels Established to Review US Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, Countermeasures on US
Imports, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/news e/news18_e/
dsb_19nov18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/VBS9-DNBF].
188. Request for Consultation by the European Union, United States—Certain
Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 1, 2018).
189. Id. (finding the measures as enacted “appear to nullify or impair the benefits
accruing to the European Union directly or indirectly under the covered agreements,” and,
therefore, the EU has the right to address claims under the provisions of the agreement).
190. Request for Consultation by Canada, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS550/1 (June 6, 2018) (noting that section 232 is
not consistent with the GATT because it includes factors other than those necessary for
the protection of essential security interests); Request for Consultation by Mexico, United
States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS551/1 (June 7,
2018) (clarifying that Mexico concurs the measures are not justifiable under the GATT).
191. Id.
192. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
193. Id. at 50. When Russia restricted Ukraine from using its transit routes in
contravention of WTO obligations, a WTO panel found that the “self-judging”
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rejected the argument that Article XXI confers a non-justiciable
inherent right and found that the provision is not completely selfjudging.194 The Appellate Body should adopt this interpretation and
allow the Member to determine itself if the security interest is essential
but permit a panel to review that decision.195
B. Question 2: Which Article Controls
The Appellate Body would next have to determine the meaning of
“essential security interest,” beginning with Article 31 and moving to
Article 32 if the result is ambiguous or manifestly absurd.
1.

Article 31: General rules
The starting point for any treaty interpretation takes a good faith look
at the ordinary meaning of the terms in light of the object and purpose,
found in VCLT Article 31.1.196 This means first looking to the object and
purpose of the entirety of the WTO Agreement. Simply put, the object
and purpose of the WTO is to increase trade liberalization through the
reduction of tariffs, as evidenced by the preamble to the Marrakesh
Agreement.197 The context used to determine the object and purpose is
the entirety of the WTO Agreement, including the preamble, provisions,
and the annexes, as well as the structure of the agreement.198 All aspects
of the WTO Agreements, including the provisions of the GATT, push the
parties toward decreasing trade barriers by reducing and binding tariffs
and by limiting the trade-related actions that Members can legally
pursue.199 Therefore, when analyzing the term “essential security
interests” from Article XXI,200 the interpreter must constrain the
interpretation in a narrow fashion in order to conform to the object and
purpose of the entirety of the WTO Agreement. However, the status of
Article XXI as an exception is key, as the purpose of an exception is to
break the rule, and, accordingly, it would be illogical to interpret
Article XXI in a manner that would conform to the object and purpose
of the rest of the Articles.
provision of Article XXI was not a complete bar for judicial review. This was the first
time the WTO had interpreted the extent of the provision. Id.
194. See id.
195. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 82, at 426.
196. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.1.
197. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 33.
198. See supra Section I.C.1.
199. GATT, supra note 1, art. II.
200. Id. art. XXI.
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The next step is looking to Article 31.2,201 the agreements made at the
conclusion of the treaty. The Member states continued to create many
agreements at the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, including the
Agreement on Agriculture, the Customs Valuation Agreement, and, most
closely associated with this case, the Safeguard Agreement.202 However,
none of the agreements created near the conclusion of the WTO
Agreement had any substantive relation with, or referred to, Article XXI.
Finding no answers in agreements made at the conclusion of the treaty,
the next step is Article 31.3, which looks to subsequent agreements,
subsequent practice, and the “relevant rules of international law.”203 The
first element is not determinative, as the WTO has only managed to negotiate
one agreement subsequent to the conclusion of the WTO Agreement in
1994, the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).204 The TFA entered into
force in February 2017; however, it only applies to WTO Members who
accept its provisions, and it substantively applies primarily to intellectual
property issues and is therefore not useful for interpreting “essential.”205
Subsequent practice highlights the failures of the GATT system prior
to the creation of the WTO.206 At five separate times in the GATT’s
history, Members have imposed similar tariffs to the current U.S. steel
and aluminum tariffs.207 However, because a single Member was able to
block the adoption of a panel report, the GATT panel never issued
binding decisions in these cases, thus there are not subsequent practices
to consider when determining intent.
The relevant rules of international law provide additional interpretive
analogues. The IMF treaty shares a temporal and substantive connection
with the GATT, as both include a security exception and have similar
ratification years.208 Another relevant analogue is the ITO charter, as
201. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.2.
202. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 410; Agreement on Safeguards, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S. 154; Customs Valuation Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 279.
203. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.3.
204. See Trade Facilitation Agreement, Nov. 27, 2014, WTO Doc. WT/L/940.
205. Members Accepting the Protocol of Amendment to Insert the WTO Trade Facilitation
Agreement into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_agreeacc_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/RGG8-WKGT].
206. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.3(b).
207. See supra Section I.A.4.
208. See supra Section I.A.1.
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every treaty in the international legal system lays the foundation for the
systemic approach to treaty interpretation.209 Looking at the IMF, the
governing treaty expressly provides for Members to impose exchange
restrictions in an effort to preserve their national security.210 However,
the IMF can inform the Member that the institution is not satisfied that
the restriction is actually for the purpose of national security, and can
take action against the Member if it does not comply and remove the
restriction.211 Looking at the national security provisions of these other
treaties, the institutions clearly play a role in limiting the scope of the
exception, but the treaties do not contain any support for a definition
of the scope of “essential.”212
The final provision of Article 31.4 looks to the special meaning of the
term.213 Under the technical interpretation of special meaning, Article
31.4 is not determinative of the correct interpretation of “essential.” No
evidence indicates that “essential” was supposed to have a technical
meaning based on the language of the text at the conclusion of the
treaty, nor is there evidence that the WTO or the international trade
community have given “essential” an agreed-upon technical meaning
since the conclusion of the treaty.
The final interpretive tool under Article 31.4 is looking to a dictionary
to determine if the term “essential” has meanings that are substantively
different from the common meaning. Based on a common dictionary,
one that does not list technical meanings, “essential” only has two
definitions, first, “of, relating to, or constituting essence,” and second,
“of the utmost importance.”214 Neither definition is substantively
different from the common meaning of “essential” and is therefore not
useful for interpretation in this context.
The meaning of “essential security interests” remains ambiguous after
exhausting the interpretive tools of Article 31. From both the plain
language reading or a technical interpretation, none of the analytical
methods indicates the scope of the term, or what measures would fit

209. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 53 (June 21).
210. See IMF, Payments Restrictions for Security Reasons: Fund Jurisdiction, Exec. Bd. Dec.
No. 144-(52/51) (Aug. 14, 1952).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See VCLT, supra note 6, art. 31.4.
214. Essential, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
essential [https://perma.cc/NG5P-G569].
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within that scope. Therefore, it is proper to turn to Article 32 of the
VCLT for supplementary interpretive tools.215
2.

Article 32: Supplemental means
The first step is looking to preparatory works in an effort to determine
the meaning of the term “essential security interests,” which the Appellate
Body has stated is a proper use of Article 32.216 The preparatory works for
GATT Article XXI are the draft proposals and committee commentary.
The security exception originated in the New York draft of the GATT
proposed in February 1947.217 The national security language initially
resided in Article 37, General Exceptions, which provided:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in Chapter
V shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures: . . . (e) In time of war or other emergency in
international relations, relating to the protection of the essential
security interests of a Member.218

The Geneva drafters incorporated this language into the Geneva draft,
which would become the final version of the GATT, at the thirty-third
meeting of Commission A, which finalized Article 37 in July 1947.219
However, these parties first negotiated this language during the drafting
of the ITO Charter, which was included in the New York draft. From the
ninth meeting of the technical sub-committee, the delegates, particularly
those from the United Kingdom (U.K.), worried that the language of the
proposed exception “covered a far wider field” than traditional exceptions
to import prohibitions and restrictions.220 To alleviate this fear, the U.K.

215. See VCLT, supra note 6, art. 32 (recourse to Article 32 is valid when the
interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning of the term ambiguous,
obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable).
216. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 195, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005).
217. See U.N. ECOSOC, Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of
the U.N. Conf. on Trade & Employment, at 31–32, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34 (Feb. 25, 1947).
218. Id.
219. U.N. ECOSOC, 2nd Sess., 33rd mtg. at 19–21, U.N. Doc. EPCT/A/PV/33 (July 24,
1947) (explaining that the drafters were concerned about the security exception being “too
wide” and therefore included “essential” and “times of war” to narrow the exception).
220. U.N. ECOSOC, 1st Sess., 9th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/50 (Nov. 13, 1946).
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representative proposed language that would reject restrictions that
“constitute a . . . disguised restriction on international trade.”221
While drafting the ITO Charter, the U.S. delegation, who proposed the
final security exception language, debated the scope of the exception.222
One faction of the delegation asserted that the wording was such that it
conferred a power allowing the United States, or any other Member, to
determine if the measures were necessary, and how the measure related
to an enumerated provision.223 However, this language did not make its
way into the final draft, as other delegates stated that under the proposed
language, “member[s] could avoid any Charter obligation by a mere
unilateral invocation of its essential security interest” and that its
inclusion would “destroy[] the efficacy of the entire Charter.”224 The
U.S. delegation chose not to include the language in the final draft
because the Charter would fail if any Member could rely on “the pretext
of national security [to] take any measure whatsoever it might wish in
complete disregard of all provisions of the Charter.”225
Additionally, the delegates wanted to constrain the scope of the
exception, as previous trade agreements required measures taken for
national security to be “in the face of a clear and present danger.”226 The
proposed language would have expanded that to any measure relating to
general public security. However, that interpretation would again “tear
the heart out of the Charter” as there is “no clear distinction between
‘security’ industries and other industries, and any basic industry might be
defended as essential from the security standpoint.”227 Thus, from the
discussions of the U.S. delegation, the proposed language clearly
intended a narrow understanding of national security.
One exchange at the finalization of Article XXI between the Dutch
negotiator, Dr. Speekenbrink, and the U.S. negotiator, John Leddy, is
particularly enlightening. Dr. Speekenbrink began the conversation
with a clarifying question:

221. Id.
222. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THE FIRST BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: U.S.
POSTWAR FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION TREATIES 148 (2017) (replacing “any
measure which [a Member] may deem necessary” with “independent power of
interpretation” and later “which [a Member] may consider to be necessary and relate to”).
223. See id.
224. Id. at 148–49.
225. Id.
226. Draft Letter, John Leddy to Will Clayton, June 13, 1946, RG 43, A1 698,
‘Charter: Security,’ box 13, USNA.
227. Id.
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Just before you start, I would ask for some further clarification on
(e). I see, “In time of war or other emergency in international
relations, relating to the protection of the essential security interests
of a Member.” I have, I may say, read that phrase many times, and
still I cannot get the real meaning of it.228

Specifically, Dr. Speekenbrink asked, “The second point that is troubling
me here is, what are the ‘essential security interests’ of a Member? I find
that kind of exception very difficult to understand, and therefore possibly
a very big loophole in the whole Charter.”229 Here, the negotiators
evidently had similar concerns to those of the present day, namely that
Members could abuse this provision because of the unclear language.
The Chairman recognized John Leddy to answer these questions, as
the United States had put forward the draft language, which was
identical to their proposal.230 Leddy responded that the United States
“recognized that there was a great danger of having too wide an
exception and we could not put it into the Charter, simply by saying: ‘by
any Member of measures relating to a Member’s security interests,’
because that would permit anything under the sun.”231 As the United
States recognized the threat, it attempted to draft the provision “which
would take care of really essential security interests and, at the same
time, so far as we could, to limit the exception.”232
Leddy then addressed the issue of the scope of “essential security
interests” directly, stating, “We cannot make it too tight, because we
cannot prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons.
On the other hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of
security, countries will put on measures which really have a commercial
purpose.”233 From this, commercial or economic measures clearly do not
fall within the scope of the exception as understood by the drafters of
the GATT. The chair of the committee closed the discussion with this:
“We might remember that it is a paragraph of the Charter of the
[GATT] and when the [GATT] is in operation I think the atmosphere
inside the [GATT] will be the only efficient guarantee against abuses of
the kind to which the Netherlands Delegate has drawn our attention.”234
Thus, after completing an Article 32 analysis, the only logical conclusion
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

U.N. ECOSOC, 2nd Sess., 33rd mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. EPCT/A/PV/33 (July 24, 1947).
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
Id.
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is that the drafters intended a narrow interpretation of the term
“essential security interest,” or at the least, construed it in a way that
does not allow for purely commercial or economic interests.
C. Question 3: If You Break the Rules, Do You Have to Pay
The preceding analysis demonstrates the narrow scope of the security
exception. The U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs would not fall within that
scope as their purpose is purely economic. Thus, the United States is not
in compliance with its obligations under Article XXI. As the Appellate
Body has repeatedly held, when a Member does not comply with a
GATT provision, that non-compliance constitutes a prima facie case of
nullification or impairment under GATT Article XXIII.235 From this
point, there are two possible outcomes: the conclusion that the United
States must stop imposing these tariffs, or a shift in the burden of proof
to the United States, which would require the United States to demonstrate
that the measure is in place for a reason other than to aid their economy.236
CONCLUSION
The U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs do not fall within the scope of the
national security exception of Article XXI as the tariffs do not protect
an “essential security interest.” The Appellate Body should find that it
has the jurisdiction to hear a dispute over Article XXI, as the provision
is justiciable, based on an examination of the drafting history and
subsequent practice. Once reaching the interpretation of the term
“essential security interest” itself, the Appellate Body should look to
the supplemental means of interpretation in Article 32 and examine
the preparatory works for the drafter’s intent.
In the preparatory works, the Members had a clear understanding as to
the original scope of “essential security interests” in Article XXI. The
drafters of the GATT recognized the potential for abuse that is inherent
in the security exception and worked to limit the scope of the exception to
not include commercial or economic purposes. The Trump Administration
implemented the present tariffs for an explicit commercial purpose in the
name of “economic security,” and therefore, the tariffs do not fall within
the scope of the exception. This non-compliance sets the United States up
for a loss under Article XXIII, as it has nullified or impaired a benefit that
it is obligated to extend to Members.
235. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII (noting that no Member has successfully
rebutted a prima facie case of nullification or impairment).
236. Id.
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At this particular point in time, it is essential to remember the purpose
of the international trade system. The drafters of the GATT conducted
their negotiations with the specter of World War II looming large in
everyone’s memories. The horrors of the war provided the impetus for
the initial twenty-three Members to find a consensus that states should
have limitations on trade remedies. This system survived and even
flourished, for sixty-five years through some of the most tumultuous
periods in history, from the oil crisis and the cold war to decolonization
and 9/11. The one constant throughout was consensual decisionmaking and the adherence to the rules, regardless of any particular
nation’s outcomes. It is therefore necessary for the membership to
control the atmosphere inside the WTO and continue that tradition;
else, someone flip the Monopoly board.

